

DISCRIMINATE USE OF FORCE (DUF)

(Draft summary 12/20)

Introduction

The notion of using military force discriminately is not new. In the past, military tools available to political and military leaders did not usually support such use. This situation is changing. New weapons – precision and "non-lethal" -- are just one of the emerging capabilities that can enable discriminant use of force. Others are discussed below.

In addition to the emerging ability to apply force in a discriminate way, the demand to use force more discriminately is growing. Efficiency is one motivation. Much more significant is the need for discriminate use when there are multiple strategic (and operational) objectives that can be in tension with each other.

Objectives such as rolling back an aggressor, causing a regime change, destroying terrorist organizations and decapitating a military capability can coexist in the same campaign with minimizing casualties (theirs and ours), preserving infrastructure, holding international coalitions together, not waging war on a people or a religion, even not waging war on most of the adversary's military forces. When multiple competing objectives exist together, attacking the "wrong" target can cause more "damage" than not attacking the right target.

The Task Force's notion of discriminate use of force is related to some of the thinking about effects-based operations (EBO). We say some, because there are different articulations of EBO.

- Some emphasize efficiency – a way to avoid waste of munitions, sorties and lives, by attacking an adversary's center of gravity. (Critics say it is naïve to try to wage war on the cheap by seeking to identify and attack centers of gravity).
- Others emphasize comprehensiveness – a way to use all the elements of national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic – DIME) in concert against an adversary.
- Still others emphasize speed – a way to quickly impose our will on an adversary, to halt aggression, stop killing, or prevent WMD use.

We do not see DUF as not primarily about efficient use of force. Rather it is largely about force effectiveness in the face of competing objectives and the inevitable friction of war.

We do not see DUF as about limited or gradual use of force. The force used may be overwhelming. The intent is to apply that force discriminately, to achieve the desired effects and avoid undesired effects in order to meet all the objectives.

The EBO construct we associate most closely is an attempt to take into account all effects in the planning and conduct of a campaign involving military force in which there is a tension among the strategic and operational objectives. The effects that must be

accounted for in these circumstances include military and other, desired and undesired, expected and unanticipated, and primary and secondary.

Criticism of DUF (and EBO)

- "We are already doing this". *Perhaps, but not to the extent we believe possible and necessary.*
- "It can't be done". *Yes if the "it" promises quick and bloodless campaigns, but we have no such expectations.*
- "Most sought-after effects reside only in the enemy's mind and will never be fully known". –Yes, *but the challenge is to improve our ability to observe and assess what's important, and not simply dub important what's easily measured.*
- "Restraint in the use of force may be interpreted as weakness" – *DUF is not about restraint but about clarity of objectives and attention to achieving multiple competing objectives.*

- DoD doesn't own all the needed assets needed to conduct discriminate campaigns". *This is a real challenge. The solution may eventually require major reengineering of the nation's national security apparatus, but in the meantime we offer some recommendations.*

Enablers:

Five "enablers" are critical to being able to apply discriminate force in a wide range of circumstances.

1. Military capabilities conducive to DUF

- Weapons -- precision standoff and "non-lethal"
- ISR -- comprehensive and persistent, to support targeting (in its broadest sense) and assessing the actual effects (BDA writ large)
- Special forces – trained as weapons and ISR
- Offensive information operations (including psyops)

2. Understanding the adversary as a complex adaptive system

- Must be tied intimately to operational planning and execution
- Puts great demand on intelligence and fusion of information, available but not actionable
 - > Fragmented and dispersed
 - > Often contradictory
- Requires synthesizing models of the adversary:

Must account for the physical and softer dimensions

JWAC experience mostly with physical, but more recently softer dimensions

- Expectation is not near perfect predication but rather that a comprehensive coherent effort to understand adversaries in a systemic way can enable the decision superiority needed for effective campaigns based on DUF

3. Robust collaboration on DUF campaign among key participants

- Planning, executing, and assessing a DUF campaign
- From the JFC perspective (military, operational–level, joint, multi–national) collaboration should include political leadership, coalition partners, military subordinates, and experts on the adversary as a complex adaptive system
- Objective goes beyond sharing information, to higher cognitive levels of knowledge and understanding:
 - > To deal with adaptive adversaries
 - > To deal with the friction, uncertainties, and ambiguities inherent in any military campaign (plans are nothing, planning everything)

4. People and processes prepared to plan and execute a holistic campaign

- Goes beyond a collaborative military campaign
- Synchronization/unity of effort of all elements of national power (DIME)
- Account for full range of effects (military and other, desired and other, expected and other, primary and other)

5. Anticipatory vice reactive strategic orientation to adversaries

- Continuous collection, analysis and planning applicable to a wide range of possible adversaries
- Not just focused on current hot spots

Status of US capabilities: In all five enablers, US capabilities are not what they need to be. However, for most of them, there is either already a substantial effort (precision weapons, collaborative environments), or widespread understanding of the need to improve (to transform low density stove–piped ISR assets into a much more pervasive integrated network of sensors), and/or recommendations from other groups and DSB Task Forces (intelligence fusion and understanding of adversaries as complex adaptive systems)

In the first three enablers, areas deserving more focus include non–lethal weapons and preparing for adaptable adversaries. There remains a tendency to focus on only the planning part and not enough on the observing, assessing and adapting ourselves.

The major deficiencies, however, are in the fourth and fifth enablers including a failure to:

- Look at a broader range of countries & contingencies than we do now,
- Integrate the information about them like we do on the pressing, front–burner cases
- Work systematically the question of the likely effects of combinations of instruments, taking account of "all" effects

Recommendations: To address these deficiencies the task force offers two major recommendations:

1. Establish a Strategic Campaign Support Center

To institutionalize a strategic focus on the broad array of potential threats that confront the United States and its allies, similar to the focus that led to success during the Cold War, our task force recommends establishing a Strategic Support Center. The primary mission of the center would be to develop "strategic campaign plans" for future contingencies – accounting for potential strategic and operational contexts (including US objectives), inventing concepts of operations involving all instruments of US power, and gaming alternative courses of action. Its focus would not be on current hot spots –these would be getting the necessary attention. Rather it would encompass several dozen or so possible future threats chosen on the basis of likelihood and consequence.

The Center would try to do at the strategic level what Joint Force Commanders and their staffs do at the operational level, or their subordinates at the tactical level. But its texture will be rather too diplomatic for DoD, too military for State, too oriented to open source information for the IC. The center would work very closely with the intelligence community and other sources of information, and with JWAC-like efforts that develop systemic "models" of the adversary.

Products of the Center would be offered for consideration by the Deputies Group and other national leaders. Preferred options could be quickly expanded by the Deputies Group into a draft inter-agency tasking order to coordinate all elements of national power in response to an impending crisis. The appropriate combatant commander would use the tasking to develop a plan of military actions to support the integrated national response. Other agency heads would use the tasking order to similarly guide their efforts.

The Center would also be a resource that the combatant commanders could use in peacetime to provide a strategic campaign plan for those emergent threats that their staffs seldom have to time to consider. However the center's scope is much broader than that of the combatant commander in that it provides strategic planning options and formulations that could be executed by the departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, Homeland Defense and others. Consequently, the center's products should be helpful in coordinating our diplomatic, informational, intelligence and economic actions, prior to the need for force (the increasing ISR capabilities will offer new options for the use of force).

There is the question of where to put the center, organizationally and geographically. We don't have a definitive answer (several alternatives are offered in the report) but we do suggest that the first phase of developing this capability should focus on working with the Combatant Commands with new global responsibilities – SOCOM and STRATCOM. These commands face challenges – needing to prepare for operations in any part of the

globe and in most cases needing to integrate the military operations within a much broader strategic campaign plan. While full implementation would take years, we believe early payoffs will be substantial.

2. Make changes to the professional development of military leaders

The very nature of DUF and EBO implies the need for military leaders able to integrate the planning and execution of military operations into complex strategic contexts.

Our Task Force identified the changes needed to four areas of professional development in order to implement the ideas underlying Discriminate Use of Force (DUF). These areas are career paths, professional education (both civilian and military), management and increased support of Foreign Area Officer programs, and re-invigorating Foreign Officer Exchange programs. The recommendations in the report aim at providing intellectually agile military leadership (Joint Staff, Combatant Command Staffs, JFC, JFC's staff, etc.) capable of developing and executing DUF.

The most important of these recommendations involve changes to professional military education. Educating future military leaders must go beyond traditional linear force on force concepts to include effects-based operations, complex adaptive systems, unconventional and non-military forms of force, and dealing with competing strategic objectives. Additionally, we need to educate military and civilian professionals to have broad and deep understandings of key regions, countries, and cultures. This will need to include, but not be limited to, university and PME, language education, and foreign military exchange programs at war colleges and schools.